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SURPRISING ORIGINALISM:
THE REGULA LECTURE* 
Lawrence B. Solum** 
I. INTRODUCTION: PRECONCEPTIONS ABOUT ORIGINALISM 
My impression is that most Americans believe that they already 
know everything they need to know about constitutional originalism. 
Originalism is based on two ideas: (1) the meaning of the constitutional 
text was fixed at the time each provision was framed and ratified; and (2) 
courts and officials should be bound by that fixed meaning.1 These ideas 
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** Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I owe thanks to the 
participants at the Regula Lecture for their questions and comments and to Randy Barnett and Michael 
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1. This Article is part of a larger project that is in progress. The treatment here is informal
and brief. The larger project is longer, formal, and more theoretical. See Lawrence B. Solum, 
Originalist Theory and Precedent: A Public Meaning Approach, CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 
2018); Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and the 
Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621 (2018); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist 
Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269 (2017); Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Original 
Meaning of the Constitutional Text, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015); Lawrence B. Solum, 
Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2015); Lawrence B. Solum, 
Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 480 (2013); Lawrence B. 
Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013); Lawrence B. 
Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479 (2013); Lawrence 
B. Solum, Construction and Constraint, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEG. STUD. 17, 22 (2013); Lawrence B. 
Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 Const. Comment. 95 (2011); Lawrence B. 
Solum, What Is Originalism? in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (Grant Huscroft and Bradley W. Miller eds., Cambridge University Press, 2011); 
Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 440 
(2009); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
923-981 (2009). In addition to the published and forthcoming articles, works in progress include 
Lawrence B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis (unpublished work-in-progress, August 20, 2105); 
Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle: Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice 
(unpublished manuscript, March 24, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940215. The earliest version of the project was developed in a work that is 
still in progress, Semantic Originalism, November 22, 2008, https://papers.ssrn.com/
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are simple but many Americans may be surprised to learn what 
originalists today actually think about many topics, including the nature 
of original meaning, the implications of originalism for a variety of issues, 
and the justifications for originalism. Even sophisticated lawyers may be 
surprised by the reality of contemporary originalism. Today’s “public 
meaning originalism” is not yesterday’s “doctrine of original intent.” 
Although Americans revere the Constitution,2 they disagree about 
originalism.3 Conservatives and libertarians are sure that originalism is a 
necessary corrective to the liberal excesses of the Warren Court.4 
Progressives have an almost unshakeable belief that originalism is a right-
wing ideology that seeks to legitimize conservative outcomes by invoking 
the prestige of the Founding Fathers.5 One distinguished legal scholar has 
gone so far as to suggest that using the word “originalism” to describe a 
theory that does not invariably lead to conservative outcomes is 
Orwellian.6 On both the left and the right, minds are made up, because 
most of us are pretty sure that there is nothing surprising to be learned 
about originalism. 
My aim in this year’s Regula Lecture is to provide some food for 
thought. Contemporary originalist constitutional theory and practice turn 
out to be surprising—in fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that 
originalism is very surprising indeed. Unless you have been following 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244. 
2. Preston D. Hutson, The Oxford Handbook of the U.S. Constitution Edited by Mark Tushnet, 
Mark A. Graber and Sanford Levinson, Oxford University Press, 2015, HOUS. LAW., March/April 
2016, at 42 (“Americans revere the Constitution as a sacred text justifying their continued belief in 
a Constitutional faith.”). 
3. See generally Neal Devins and Nicole Mansker, Public Opinion and State Supreme Courts, 
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455, 456-57 (2010); Ryan D. Walters, Fragmenting the Judiciary: Shifting 
Implementation of Supreme Court Doctrine from Federal Courts to State Courts, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 
951, 952 (2014). 
4. Peter J. Smith, Originalism and Level of Generality, 51 GA. L. REV. 485, 556 (2017) (“The 
old originalism was primarily a response to the perceived excesses of the Warren Court.”); 
JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY 66-67, 92-110 (2005); John Calhoun, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in 
Supreme Court and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124 YALE L.J. 484, 514 (2014) (“Textualism and 
originalism developed in part in response to discomfort with the perceived excesses of the Warren 
Court.”). 
5. See Calvin TerBeek, Originalism’s Obituary, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 29, 33–5 (2015); Robert 
Post and Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 549 & 567 (2006); Sheldon D. Pollack, Constitutional Interpretation as 
Political Choice, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 989, 1003 (1987); James E. Fleming, The New Originalist 
Manifesto, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 539, 544 (2012); see also Keith E. Whittington, Is Originalism Too 
Conservative?,34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 38 (2011)). 
6. Martin H. Redish and Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, 
and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 
1509 (2012). 
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constitutional jurisprudence very closely, it is likely that much of what 
you believe about originalism is inaccurate, incomplete, or just plain 
wrong. 
This article takes the reader on a guided tour of contemporary 
originalism. Along the way, I will engage in speculation about the original 
meaning of various constitutional provisions. Let me be crystal clear: this 
Article does not reach conclusions about the original meaning of any 
particular constitutional provision. Reaching firm conclusions requires 
meticulous research and analysis that I have not undertaken and that could 
only be presented in an extensive treatment—a long article on each topic. 
Rather, I am presenting my tentative views, informed by long experience 
with originalism and a deep familiarity with the constitutional text, but 
not by rigorous application of the best originalist methodology.7 I am 
prepared to be surprised once the research has been done. Indeed, that is 
the whole point: originalism as it is practiced today does not fit our 
preconceptions. Originalism can and does surprise us—once we know 
what originalism really is. 
This Article discusses three ways in which originalism is surprising: 
Surprising theory is the topic of Part I.8 Surprising implications are 
explored in Part II.9 Surprising justifications are the subject of Part III.10 
The Conclusion reflects on the implications of surprising originalism. 
II. A SURPRISING THEORY
The word “originalism” was first introduced into the vocabulary of 
American constitutional theory in 1981 by law professor Paul Brest.11 But 
the core originalist ideas predated Brest’s neologism.12 From the very 
beginning, American constitutional jurisprudence has recognized that the 
meaning of the constitutional text does not change; the ideas13 
7. See Solum, Originalist Methodology, supra note 1. 
8. See infra Part I, p. 4. 
9. See infra Part II, p. 20. 
10. See infra Part III, p. 42. 
11. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 
(1980). 
12. Brest wrote after critics of the Warren Court and “living constitutionalism” were beginning 
to flesh out the ideas that later gelled into contemporary originalist constitutional theory. This early 
stage of originalist theorizing has been called “Proto-Originalism.” We can call these early versions 
of originalism “Proto-Originalism.” See Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra 
note 1, at 462–63. 
13. The word “ideas” has philosophical connotations that I do not intend to convey here. The
word “content” would be more precise, but that word may sound odd to readers who are not familiar 
with contemporary philosophy of language or theoretical linguistics. The content of a text or oral 
communication is the set of concepts and propositions conveyed. Thus, the public “communicative 
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communicated by the text are fixed at the time each provision of the 
constitution is set down on paper.14 Further, the fixed meaning of the 
constitutional text is not mere advice: it is binding! Judges do not have the 
power to promulgate “stealth amendments” to the Constitution in the 
guise of “interpretation.”15 The constitution should constrain judges—it is 
not a blank check. Nothing about these ideas should be surprising: I 
believe it is quite likely that most of the bar and bench would agree with 
the core originalist ideas of fixation and constraint, although things might 
be different in the rarefied atmosphere of the ivory tower and the august 
chambers of the highest courts. 
A. The Wrong Question: What Would James Madison Do? 
Many Americans who agree with the core originalist ideas of fixation 
and constraint disagree with “originalism” as they understand the word. 
Somewhere along the way, the perception of originalism by the bar and 
bench, the general public, and even most law professors became distorted. 
In part this is because some of the early critiques of the Warren Court 
emphasized what are called “the original intentions of the framers.”16 The 
early reaction to originalism in the academy was swift: the whole idea of 
“original intent” makes no sense17—and even if it did make sense, we 
wouldn’t want to ground our constitutional jurisprudence on the thoughts 
of white property-owning males who lived in a world that is very different 
than our own.18 
content” of the constitutional text is the set of propositions conveyed to the public by the text at the 
time each provision was framed and ratified. 
14. This idea is the Fixation Thesis. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The
Original Meaning of the Constitutional Text, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015). Michael Dorf argues 
that fidelity to the constitution does not require adherence to the fixed original meaning of the 
constitutional text but could instead be fidelity to the contemporary meaning of the text. Despite this 
distinguished company. Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2040–
44 (2012). This argument does not deny the Fixation Thesis, but it does challenge the constraint 
principle. See infra note 15. 
15. This idea is the Constraint Principle. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle:
Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice (unpublished manuscript, March 24, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940215. 
16. These early forms of originalism could be called “Proto-Originalism.” See Solum, 
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 1, at 462. 
17. In addition to Brest, supra note 11, there were many other prominent critics of the
intentionalist approach. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985); Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 470 
(1981). 
18. R. George Wright, Originalism and the Problem of Fundamental Fairness, 91 MARQ. L. 
REV. 687, 693 (2008); Philip C. Kissam, Explaining Constitutional Law Publicly, Or, Everyman’s 
Constitution, 71 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 77, 89 (2002); Harold Anthony Lloyd, “Original” Means Old, 
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Indeed, the notion of the original intentions of the framers has been 
parodied by equating originalism with the question, “What would James 
Madison do?”19 However, that is not the question that contemporary 
originalists ask. More than thirty years ago, the mainstream of originalist 
constitutional theory turned away from intentionalism and toward 
textualism. One of the most important events in this turn was a talk given 
by Justice Scalia, in which he urged originalists to “change the label from 
the Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning.”20 
Indeed, almost all of the actual development of originalism after the 
publication of Brest’s critique has assumed that we should not be asking 
what James Madison would do, or what he would have thought about 
contemporary problems, or what the members of the Philadelphia 
Convention believed about the purposes, goals, or expected applications 
of the Constitution that they proposed for ratification. By the 1990s, it was 
clear that there was a “New Originalism” that was concerned with the 
original public meaning of the constitutional text. This new originalism 
was first elaborated by Professor Gary Lawson,21 followed by many 
others including, Professors Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash.22 
Where did the idea that originalists want to know what would James 
Madison do come from? One source may be the early prominence of 
Raoul Berger, whose book Government by Judiciary, included a chapter 
entitled “Why the Original Intention?.”23 Berger was characterized by 
Paul Brest as a “strict intentionalist” and originalist in 1981, the same year 
that Brest coined the word “originalism.”24 Attorney General Edwin 
Meese promoted the doctrine of original intent in a series of prominent 
speeches.25 
“Original” Means New: An “Original” Look at What “Originalists” Do, 67 NAT’L LAW. GUILD 
REV. 135, 149 (2010). 
19. See, e.g., Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor: 
Using Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1181, 
1190 (2017); Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 
382 (2013); Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 385, 396 
(2009); Carl T. Rowan, Equality As A Constitutional Concept, 47 MD. L. REV. 10, 12 (1987). 
20. Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic Liberties 
in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 101 
at 106 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice ed., 1987). 
21. See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 875 (1992). 
22. See Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 553 (1994). 
23. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, ch. 21 (rev. ed. 1997). 
24. Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1089 (1981). The first use of the word is 
in Brest, The Misconceived Quest, supra note 11. 
25. See Edwin Meese III, Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985),
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Moreover, the idea of “original intentions” has never entirely 
disappeared. Following Brest’s critique, intentionalism was defended by 
Richard Kay26 and there is now a “new intentionalism” that is based on 
some very sophisticated work in the philosophy of language. The new 
intentionalism is based on the idea that the drafter of a constitutional 
provision has a “communicative intention”—the meaning the drafter of 
each constitutional provision intended to convey to readers.27 
This new version of intentionalism avoids many of the problems of 
the old version: it does not require that we identify the concrete policy 
preferences of the framers. One of the new intentionalism’s chief virtues 
is that it almost always converges with public meaning originalism.28 The 
drafters were writing for the public. The constitutional text was drafted to 
be read by “We the People.” This idea was eloquently expressed by the 
great Supreme Court Justice, Joseph Story, in his magisterial 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States: 
In the first place, then, every word employed in the constitution is to be 
expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context 
furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it. Constitutions 
are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of 
expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for 
the exercise of philosophical acuteness, or judicial research. They are 
instruments of a practical nature, founded on the common business of 
human life, adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and 
reprinted in The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Written Constitution (Paul G. Cassell ed., 1986); see 
also Edwin Meese III, The Case for Originalism, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, June 6, 2005, 
https://www.heritage.org/commentary/the-case-originalism 
[https://www.heritage.org/commentary/the-case-originalism]; Lynette Clemetson, Meese’s Influence 
Looms in Today’s Judicial Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/17/politics/meeses-influence-looms-in-todays-judicial-wars.html 
[https://perma.cc/23M5-B2E9]. 
26. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988). 
27. To be more precise, the new intentionalism is the view that the original meaning of the
constitutional text is the meaning that the drafters intended to convey to their intended readers via the 
reader’s recognition of the drafters’ communicative intentions. This idea is based on the work of Paul 
Grice. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 3–143 (1989). For a Gricean approach to 
original intentions originalism, see Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism in THE CHALLENGE 
OF ORIGINALISM 87 (Grant Huscroft and Bradley W. Miller eds. 2011); see also John F. Manning, 
What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 72 n.7 (2006); Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy, Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, and Legal Positivism, 42 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 493, 510 n.57 (2005). 
28. Because the constitution was drafted for “We the People,” the meaning that the authors of 
the constitutional text intended to convey to the public (the intended readers) will be the public 
meaning in the absence of some kind of linguistic mistake. For this reason, the new intentionalism 
converges with public meaning originalism in almost all cases. 
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fitted for common understandings. The people make them; the people 
adopt them; the people must be supposed to read them, with the help of 
common sense; and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite 
meaning, or any extraordinary gloss.29 
Because the drafters of the constitutional text wrote for the public, the 
meaning that they intended to convey was the public meaning—the 
original public meaning of the constitutional text. 
The now old-fashioned doctrine of original intent played an 
important role in the early history of originalism. That is why the mistaken 
belief that originalism is about the original intent of the framers is 
understandable—even if it is about 30 years out of date. 
B. The Right Question: What Is the Public Meaning of the 
Constitutional Text? 
“What would Madison do?” is the wrong question. Here is the right 
question: “What was the public meaning of the constitutional text?” This 
is public meaning originalism. 
In “What was the public meaning?”—the “was” is important. Words 
change meaning over time: this is the well-known phenomenon of 
linguistic drift or semantic shift.30 The word “satellite” originally meant 
“bodyguard” but Johannes Kepler used “satellite” metaphorically to 
describe the moons of Jupiter and Jules Verne borrowed the metaphor to 
apply it to a fictional man-made device orbiting the Earth. Verne’s usage 
was borrowed to apply to Sputnik.31 And now the primary meaning of 
satellite is “a manufactured object or vehicle intended to orbit the earth, 
the moon, or another celestial body” and the original sense of bodyguard 
is no longer in use.32 English is like a living organism; it grows and 
changes. 
What does linguistic drift have to do with the constitution? Consider 
the phrase “domestic violence,” which appears in Article IV of the 
Constitution: “The United States shall guarantee to every state in this 
29. JOSEPH L. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §451 
(1833); see also State of Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 398 (1920) (stating, “in the exposition 
of statutes and constitutions, every word ‘is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, 
unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify or enlarge it,’ and there cannot be 
imposed upon the words ‘any recondite meaning or any extraordinary gloss.’”) (citing Story). 
30. See SOL STEINMETZ, SEMANTIC ANTICS: HOW AND WHY WORDS CHANGE MEANING 49–
50 (Random House 2008). 
31. See id. at 200. 
32. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/satellite 
[perma.cc/S5PM-8GCH] (last visited May 21, 2018). 
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union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them 
against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive 
(when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.”33 
Today the phrase “domestic violence” refers to “‘intimate partner abuse,’ 
‘battering,’ or ‘wife-beating,’” and it is understood to be “physical, sexual, 
psychological, and economic abuse that takes place in the context of an 
intimate relationship, including marriage.”34 
But this twenty-first century meaning of “domestic violence” was 
unknown in the late eighteenth century when Article IV was drafted. It 
would simply be a linguistic mistake to interpret the domestic violence 
clause of Article IV of the Constitution of 1789 as referring to spouse or 
child abuse. The anachronistic reading of “domestic violence” would be 
mistaken because meaning (or more technically semantic content) is fixed 
at the time when a text is written.35 When we interpret the constitutional 
text, we seek the original meaning and not some new meaning that is a 
product of a linguistic accident. 
In the case of “domestic violence,” hardly anyone is tempted to 
substitute the contemporary meaning for the original meaning—although 
a whole law review article has been written that tries to do just that.36 Why 
not? Because the surrounding context of Article IV plus a bit of 
knowledge about the historical circumstances in which the constitution 
was drafted are sufficient to steer us to the original meaning.  We can then 
intuitively grasp that the original meaning is the correct meaning of the 
constitutional text. When a law professor tries to tell us that “domestic 
violence” could mean “violence in the family,” we rebel! We know that 
the phrase “domestic violence” occurring in close proximity to the word 
“invasion” in an eighteenth-century document dealing with the basic 
structure of government and the relationship of the states to each other 
33. U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, Cl. 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every state in this
union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on 
application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against 
domestic violence.”) 
34. Glossary, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/nepal0903/3.htm
[https://perma.cc/G9BP-FKPW] (visited March 29, 2008); see Emily J. Sack, The Domestic Relations 
Exception, Domestic Violence, and Equal Access to Federal Courts, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1441 
(2006). 
35. Jack Balkin introduced me to this example. See Lawrence B. Solum, Blogging from APSA: 
The New Originalism, Legal Theory Blog (Sept. 3, 2007), http://lsolum.typepad.com/
legaltheory/2007/09/blogging-from-a.html [https://perma.cc/6CHC-JPEF](live blogging at the 
meeting of the American Political Science Association and describing Balkin’s presentation); JACK 
M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 37 (2011). 
36. Mark S. Stein, The Domestic Violence Clause in “New Originalist” Theory, 37 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 129 (2009). 
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and to the national government refers to things like “riots” and 
“rebellions” within the boundaries of a state. Our intuitive reaction to 
clever arguments that Article Four referred to spousal abuse is that these 
verbal gymnastics are a form of sophistry.37 
No one is much surprised by the news that “domestic violence” in 
Article IV does not mean “spousal abuse,” but here is an example that 
may surprise you. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution uses the 
word “dollar”: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law.38 
Contemporary readers are likely to assume that the word “dollar” 
refers to the Federal Reserve Notes. They look like this: 
A law student note has been written about the Seventh Amendment’s 
“twenty-dollar clause”—based on the assumption that the word “dollar” 
had the same meaning in 1791 that it does today, creating a problem 
because inflation has reduced the purchasing power of the paper-money 
legal-tender dollar.39 
But think about it, national legal-tender paper currency did not exist 
in the United States in 1791:40 there were no Federal Reserve Notes.41 The 
37. Mortimer Sellers, Think of Your Latin When Hurling Accusations, NAT’L L. J., Feb. 9,
1998, at A1g (“Lawyers have earned a bad name for sophistry and manipulating language to mislead 
to unwary.”). 
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
39. See Note, The Twenty Dollars Clause, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1665, 1672 (2005). 
40. The “greenback” was created by the Legal Tender Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 345. 
41. For a very brief recounting of the history, see Christopher M. Bruner, The Changing Face 
of Money, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 383, 389–94 (2010); see also Ali Khan, The Evolution of 
Money: A Story of Constitutional Nullification, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 393 (1999); Edwin Vieira, Jr., The 
Forgotten Role of the Constitution in Monetary Law, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 77 (1997); Ajit V. Pai, 
Congress and the Constitution: The Legal Tender Act of 1862, 77 OR. L. REV. 535 (1998). 
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word dollar almost certainly referred to the Spanish silver dollar weighing 
416 grains and possibly other coins that were called “dollars” with closely 
approximate silver content.42 Traces of this meaning of dollar persisted 
until 1965, when Congress enacted legislation ending the redeemability 
of silver certificates for silver bullion.43 
This is an example of a “dollar” as that term was understood by the 
public in 1791: 
Note the date and the figure in profile. It is Charles the Fourth, the 
king of Spain. This is a Spanish silver dollar, also known as a “Peso de 
Ocho” or “piece of eight.”44 
The “greenback,” precursor to the modern Federal Reserve Note, 
was not created until decades later and was the subject of much 
controversy, cumulating in the back and forth of the Legal Tender 
Cases,45 with the Supreme Court first invalidating and then upholding 
legal-tender paper currency. There is a long and complicated history that 
led to the emergence of the contemporary “dollar,” which was tied to the 
value of silver until a few decades ago.46 
Contemporary readers of the Seventh Amendment may have a strong 
42. In 1791, the word “dollar” likely referred to the Spanish silver dollar, as congressional acts 
from 1786 and 1792 indicate that the “dollar” was the Spanish silver dollar. See The Coinage Act of 
April 2, 1792, 1 Stat. 246 § 9 (1792) (enabling Congress to coin “dollars or units—each to be the 
value of a Spanish milled dollar.”); H.R. Rep. No. 23-278 at 65 (1834) (noting the Articles of 
Confederation Congress used the Spanish silver dollar standard in 1786); see also Sumner, The 
Spanish Dollar and the Colonial Shilling, 3 AMER. HIST. REV. 607 (1898). 
43. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, SILVER CERTIFICATES, 
https://www.treasury.gov/about/history/collections/Pages/silver.aspx [https://perma.cc/E2LD-R4PJ] 
See generally ARTHUR L. & IRA S. FRIEDBERG, PAPER MONEY OF THE UNITED STATES (2010). 
44. Shepard Pond, The Spanish Dollar: The World’s Most Famous Silver Coin, 15 BULLETIN
OF THE BUSINESS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 12–6. (1941). 
45. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869) overruled in part by Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 
457 (1870); Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457 (1870); Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884). 
46. For sources on the history, see supra note 41. 
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linguistic intuition that “dollar” meant then what it means today, but that 
intuition is incorrect. The eighteenth century “dollar” was a hard-money 
coin with a value that depended on its silver content and not on a federal 
statute that required that pieces of paper be accepted as payments.47 The 
primary referent of the term “dollar” in the Seventh Amendment is the 
Spanish silver dollar or more precisely any coin with silver content 
approximately equal to that of that “dollar.” 
The examples of “domestic violence” and “dollar” illustrate the 
importance of looking for the original public meaning of the 
constitutional text. Some of the words and phrases in the constitutional 
text have the same meaning today as they did when they were written. But 
some don’t. And for that reason, we must always check our linguistic 
intuitions against the historical evidence. 
What would James Madison do is the wrong question. The right 
question is: “What was the public meaning of the constitutional text?” The 
word “public” is crucial. Public meaning originalism is a form of 
textualism: we are looking for the meaning communicated to the public 
by the text.48 Public meaning is a function of both the semantic meaning 
of the words and phrases and the context in which they occur.49 The public 
meaning of the text is the meaning that was conveyed to the public at the 
time each provision was framed and ratified—not the literal meaning (just 
the words) but the full meaning (including the role of context in resolving 
ambiguities and enriching the text). 
I am sure that many readers of this Article are not surprised to learn 
that original intentions originalism has given way to public meaning 
originalism. After all, there has been a lot of talk about “public meaning 
originalism,” especially in the last few years. It came up in the 
confirmation hearings for Neil Gorsuch.50 Because Justice Scalia was a 
very well known figure, even among the general public, his advocacy of 
public meaning originalism may well have penetrated public 
consciousness.  The constitutional cognoscenti should know about public 
meaning, and most of them do—although surprisingly, even sophisticated 
writers still believe that originalism is all about original intent.51 
47. Solum, Originalist Methodology, supra note 1, at 281–82. 
48. More precisely, public meaning originalism aims to recover the communicative content of 
the constitutional text. See supra note 13. 
49. For a fuller explanation of the idea of “public meaning,” see Solum, The Public Meaning
Thesis, supra note 1. 
50. Lawrence B. Solum, Statement Presented at the Hearings on the Nomination of Honorable 
Neil M. Gorsuch to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 31 DIRITTO 
PUBBLICO COMPARATO ED EUROPEO ONLINE 575 (2017). 
51. Among the many examples is Linda Greenhouse, Justice Scalia’s Fading Legacy, N.Y. 
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Even I myself was not fully aware that the transition from intent to 
public meaning occurred in the 1980s until about twenty years later. I had 
learned about “originalism” as a law student, judicial clerk, and in the first 
year or two of my teaching career. I knew that originalism was dead. Not 
just dead, but dead dead. Dead, dead, dead! Brest killed it. Dworkin drove 
a wooden stake through its heart. Joe Biden demolished it at the Bork 
hearings. It would not rise again. 
But originalism is back! Not “Zombie Originalism,” propped up by 
a motley crew of Neanderthal true believers. Originalism is back at the 
center stage of debates about the Constitution—in the public square, in 
the courts, and in the legal academy. And the move to public meaning is 
the reason that originalism is back. 
What is “public meaning” and how do we discover it?  And now, 
another surprise! Contemporary public meaning originalists do not 
believe that we can reliably discover the public meaning of constitutional 
text by looking the words up in Noah Webster’s dictionary of 182852 or 
Samuel Johnson’s dictionary of 1755.53 Those are the best two 
dictionaries from the period, but they both have serious problems. 
The first problem is that neither dictionary was compiled at the right 
time. Samuel Johnson’s dictionary was compiled some three decades 
before the Philadelphia Convention and it reports on usage in England and 
not in the United States. Noah Webster’s dictionary was published about 
four decades after the Philadelphia Convention, and it may well have been 
influenced by debates about the Constitution. 
The second problem concerns the accuracy and completeness of the 
dictionaries. Either dictionary could misreport the conventional semantic 
meanings of its era. Either dictionary could omit a meaning that was the 
relevant public meaning of a constitutional provision once context is taken 
into account. Lots of words, including some words used in the 
Constitution, are omitted from these dictionaries. Neither dictionary 
provides primary evidence of the patterns of usage that constitute 
meaning. 
Thus, originalists have begun to look for a better way to investigate 
the meaning of words and phrases from the late eighteenth century and 
TIMES, March 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/opinion/justice-antonin-scalia-
legacy.html [http://perma.cc/GG9D-77AN] (former Supreme Court reporter for the New York Times 
and lecturer at Yale Law School stating, “Justice Scalia’s view [was] that the only legitimate basis for 
interpreting the Constitution is the original intent of its framers . . . .”). 
52. JOSHUA KENDALL, THE FORGOTTEN FOUNDING FATHER (2010). 
53. See WALTER JACKSON BATE, SAMUEL JOHNSON Ch. 15 (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1975). 
2018] SURPRISING ORIGINALISM 247 
from the mid-nineteenth century for the Reconstruction Amendments. It 
turns out that those within the discipline of linguistics have been working 
on this problem for quite some time. Ideally, we want to examine primary 
evidence of usage. Forgive me for using a bit of jargon: we are looking 
for the “conventional semantic meanings” of the words and phrases used 
in the constitutional text. Until the 1990s, this involved laborious searches 
through old texts and the transcription of examples: this is the method that 
produced the magnificent Oxford Dictionary of the English Language. 
But this approach has obvious limitations. 
The surprising new approach is called “corpus linguistics.” This is 
big data semantics. The use of this technique was pioneered by Associate 
Chief Justice Thomas Lee of the Utah Supreme Court.54 Corpus 
lexicography was utilized by the Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. 
Harris.55 And there is a growing body of legal scholarship exploring and 
using corpus techniques,56 including an important article co-authored by 
54. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 39, 356 P.3d 1258, 1271 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment); see also Note, State v Rasabout, 129 HARV L REV 1468 (2016). 
Justice Lee’s law clerk, Stephen Mouritsen, should be credited with the introduction of corpus 
lexicography to the theory of statutory and constitutional interpretation. See Stephen C. Mouritsen, 
Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics As an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 
13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156 (2012); Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not A 
Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and A Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU. L. 
REV. 1915, 1915 (2010). At about the same time as Mouritsen’s article, Neal Goldfarb authored a 
groundbreaking brief, Brief for the Project on Government Oversight, the Brechner Center for 
Freedom of Information, and Tax Analysts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, FCC v. AT&T, 
Inc. The brief is available at : https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_09_1279_PetitionerAmCuPOG
O_BrechnerCtr_andTaxAnalystsnew.authcheckdam.pdf. 
55. People v. Harris, 499 Mich. 332, 347, 885 N.W.2d 832, 838–39 (2016): 
Keeping in mind that we must interpret the word “information” as used in the DLEOA 
“according to the common and approved usage of the language,” we apply a tool that can 
aid in the discovery of “how particular words or phrases are actually used in written or 
spoken English.”  The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) allows users 
to “analyze [ ] ordinary meaning through a method that is quantifiable and verifiable.” 
Id; see also Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., No. CV 16-2394 (DLF), 2018 WL 
1542049 , fn. 5 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2018) (“The database, called the Corpus of Historical American 
English, is a giant repository of text that houses more than 400 million words collected from fiction, 
non-fiction, magazines, and newspapers published from 1810 to 2017. A search at 
corpus.byu.edu/coha for “rural district”shows a dramatic decline in usage beginning around 1950.”) 
56. See, e.g., Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor: 
Using Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181 
(2017); Lawrence M. Solan, Can Corpus Linguistics Help Make Originalism Scientific?, 126 YALE 
L.J. FORUM 57 (2016); James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner, Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & 
Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 
20 (2016); Daniel Ortner, The Merciful Corpus: The Rule of Lenity, Ambiguity and Corpus 
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Justice Lee and Stephen Mouritsen.57 The corpus approach has recently 
been applied58 to a case pending before the United States Supreme Court 
that hinges on the meaning of the phrase “officer of the United States” in 
the Appointments Clause, Lucia v. SEC.59 
Corpus linguistics provides a rigorous data-driven approach to 
constitutional semantics. It allows us to identify the range of possible 
meanings of the various words and phrases that make up the constitutional 
text. Sometimes that is the end of the matter. Some of the words and 
phrases that comprise the constitutional text may be unambiguous, having 
one and only one possible meaning. But this is actually rare. When you 
look up a word in the dictionary, you are likely to find multiple 
definitions—corresponding to multiple meanings. So, the next step in the 
determination of original public meaning is disambiguation: which of the 
possible meanings was actually communicated to the public? 
This brings us to the role of context. Again, there are some surprises. 
Even very sophisticated scholars and judges may make the mistake of 
equating originalist “textualism” with “literalism.” Thus, originalism may 
be criticized for being “acontextual”60 for ignoring the role of context in 
the production of meaning. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Originalism has always been concerned with context. Serious 
applied originalism has always involved exhaustive historical research 
that attempts to recreate the context in which the constitutional text was 
written. And recent constitutional theory has labored hard to provide the 
theoretical foundations that connect historical context to original public 
meaning. 
Lawyers intuitively know that the full “meaning” of writing is not 
reducible to its literal meaning. This same insight can be restated using 
the vocabulary of linguistics: the communicative content of a written text 
Linguistics, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 101 (2016); D. Carolina Núñez, War of the Words: Aliens, 
Immigrants, Citizens, and the Language of Exclusion, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1517 (2013). 
57. Thomas R. Lee and Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L. J. 788 
(2018). 
58. See Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 
453 (2018); James Cleith Phillips, Jacob Crump, and Benjamin Lee, Investigating the Original 
Meaning of ‘Officers of the United States’ with the Corpus of Founding-Era American English 
(unpublished manuscript) (March 24, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3126975.  
59. Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 832 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 
2016), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated (Feb. 16, 2017), on reh’g en banc, 868 F.3d 1021 
(D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub nom. Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018). 
60. See Aviva Orenstein, Sex, Threats, and Absent Victims: The Lessons of Regina v.
Bedingfield for Modern Confrontation and Domestic Violence Cases, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 115, 159 
(2010) (criticizing “Justice Scalia’s atomized, acontextual originalism”). 
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is richer than its semantic meaning. Where does the “extra” meaning come 
from? 
First, something obvious: context allows us to resolve ambiguities. 
The Constitutional text uses the word “Senate”: without consideration of 
context, that word could refer to the Roman Senate or the Senate of 
University College, London. But in context, it is clear that the word 
“Senate” refers to one of the two houses of Congress—the United States 
Senate. Contextual disambiguation is one of the keys to the recovery of 
public meaning. 
Second, something surprising: context enriches meaning—it adds 
new meaning in surprising ways. There is a fancy name for this: 
“pragmatic enrichment.” What is that? Let’s start with some simple 
examples: 
• “Jack and Jill are married.” Ordinarily when we say this, we
communicate more than we literally said. Jack and Jill are
married—to each other. The “to each other” is unstated but
implicit in what has been said. The fancy name for this is
“impliciture.”61
• “Bob is no longer the dean.” When you say this, you also
communicate what is called a “presupposition.” Bob was
once the dean.
• Someone writes a letter of recommendation for a former
student who is applying to be a Supreme Court Clerk. The
letter says, “Ann was punctual, and she regularly attended
class. I recommend her.” And that is all the letter says. Of
course, this letter communicates another message: don’t hire
Ann! The technical name for this kind of enrichment is
“implicature.”
The Constitution is full of implicitures: like many statutes, the 
Constitution frequently omits explicit reference to geographic scope, but 
most of its provisions apply only to the United States—the missing “in the 
United States” is an impliciture. One of the most famous examples of 
presupposition is the Ninth Amendment. It says, “The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people.”62 The text does not explicitly say that there 
are any “rights . . . retained by the people” but nonetheless communicates 
the existence of such rights. 
Even sophisticated constitutional scholars may not be aware of a 
61. Note that “impliciture” is spelled differently than the related term “implicature.” 
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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linguistic phenomenon that is called “modulation.”63 We can actually 
change the meaning of a word by using it in a way where the new meaning 
becomes clear. For example, the Recess Appointments Clause in the 
United States Constitution uses the phrases “recess of the Senate” and 
“session of the Senate.” Literally, a recess of the Senate could be a break 
of any kind. In fact, Noah Webster’s dictionary gave the following as the 
sixth definition of “recess”: “Remission or suspension of business or 
procedure; as, the house of representatives had a recess of half an hour.”64 
So, the President could make recess appointments while the Senate was at 
lunch. But that is probably not the meaning of “recess of the Senate.” The 
Constitution juxtaposes “recess” and “session.” Here is the language: 
“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen 
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall 
expire at the End of their next Session.”65 Recess and session are opposed 
to one another in a way that communicates a new and special meaning of 
“recess” that is limited to the period between sessions. 
You may be surprised by the fact that originalist scholars and judges 
have engaged in deep and serious study of linguistics and the philosophy 
of language. Of course, legal scholars have done interdisciplinary work 
for decades: the law and economics movement has been the most 
prominent example. We should not be surprised that twenty-first century 
originalists are using the theories and empirical methods of linguistic 
science to facilitate the rigorous and objective investigation of the original 
meaning of the constitutional text. 
III. SOME SURPRISING IMPLICATIONS
Enough theory! Let’s get down to brass tacks. Does originalism have 
surprising implications for the way that cases will be decided? 
A. The Surprising Myth: Originalism is an Inherently Conservative 
Judicial Ideology 
Let’s start with the myth: originalism is an inherently conservative 
judicial ideology.66 This myth did not come out of nowhere; it was not 
made up out of whole cloth. The rise of originalism was associated with 
63. For the exceptions, see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 
269, 288-91(2017); Lee and Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 57 at 816 n.126;  
64. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/recess 
[https://perma.cc/J25Z-AV2H] (last visited May 21, 2018). 
65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § II 
66. See supra note 5. 
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conservative critiques of the Warren Court.67 But it is one thing to identify 
conservatism as part of the “origins story” of originalism. It is quite 
another to say that originalist constitutional theory itself is inherently 
conservative. 
In fact, it would be quite surprising if originalism had contemporary 
conservative political ideology baked into its DNA. Critics of the Warren 
Court could have taken a quite different path than originalism: they could 
have argued that living constitutionalism was a good thing, but that the 
court should be packed with hardline conservatives who will translate 
their policy agenda into constitutional law. What a counterproductive 
move that would have been—with no political appeal to moderates of 
either party. Instead, the critique focused on the rule of law and 
democratic legitimacy. The Supreme Court was acting lawlessly, because 
it was ignoring the original meaning of the constitutional text. The Court 
was acting undemocratically, because it was striking down actions by 
democratically elected legislators—in cases where the text of the 
Constitution did not so require. In my opinion, it seems highly likely that 
these lines of criticism were sincere, but they were also attractive to 
advocates of originalism because they were more effective, both 
strategically and rhetorically.68 Strategically, an appeal to the rule of law 
was more likely to succeed with moderates. Rhetorically, the rule of law 
and democratic values are more appealing than an open call to politicize 
the judiciary. 
This does not mean that conservative critics of the Warren Court did 
not care about results. Obviously, they did. But it does mean that they 
became committed to a theory that is ideologically neutral at its core. 
Originalism commits us to the idea that we must follow the Constitution 
wherever it leads, whether the destination is conservative or libertarian, 
liberal or progressive. 
B. The Surprising Reality: Some Progressive Implications of an Old 
Constitution 
At this point, I think the following objection will occur to many 
readers. Sure, conservatives advanced a neutral theory that emphasized 
the rule of law and democratic legitimacy, but they only did that because 
they believed that we have a very old constitution that favors their 
conservative agenda. We will never know whether this speculation about 
67. See supra note 4.
68. For an illuminating discussion of the rhetoric associated with originalism, see rhetoric
Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009). 
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motives is entirely true because it is very difficult to discover decisive 
evidence of deep motives. But my opinion is that it is at least partially 
correct with respect to support of originalism by politicians: originalism 
garnered political support because it embraced a constitutional text that 
seemed sensible to early advocates of originalism. But is it true that our 
constitution is conservative, root and branch, through and through? 
Again, it would be surprising if a Constitution born in the aftermath 
of revolution and revised to guarantee the rights of the former slaves had 
no liberal or progressive provisions. Moreover, we are quite distant from 
the ideological world of the late eighteenth century or the mid-nineteenth 
century: it would be very surprising indeed if their political ideas mapped 
neatly onto ours. Of course, an on-balance assessment of the ideological 
implications of the original meaning of the constitutional text is a very big 
job; too big for a single article. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some 
surprising implications of an originalist approach. 
1. Gender Equality and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment
Of course, the Constitution includes an explicit gender equality 
provision, the Nineteenth Amendment: “The right of citizens of the 
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any State on account of sex.”69 Aside from the right to vote, the 
Constitution does not create explicit gender equality rights. But the 
constitutional text does employ the words “person” and “citizen.” Women 
are persons. Women are citizens. This was not in doubt in 1787 when the 
constitutional text was drafted in Philadelphia; or in 1791 when twelve 
amendments were proposed and ten ratified; or during Reconstruction 
when the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments became part 
of the Constitution. 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment reads as follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.70 
69. U.S. CONST. amend. 19. 
70. U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1. 
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The passage in italics is the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Most 
educated Americans know something about “due process” and “equal 
protection,” but even among lawyers, knowledge of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause is rare. Why is that? The answer is living 
constitutionalism: the Supreme Court adopted an interpretation of the 
clause that had the effect of making it a virtual dead letter in two notorious 
cases, the Slaughter-House Cases71 and United States v. Cruikshank.72 
Originalists differ among themselves about the meaning of the somewhat 
mysterious phrase, “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States,”73 but a leading and plausible interpretation is that these 
“privileges or immunities” include both the specific rights spelled out in 
the Bill of Rights and the basic common law rights (or natural rights), 
including the rights to own property, enter into contracts, and to pursue a 
lawful occupation. 
What does this have to do with gender equality? An originalist 
answer to this question begins with the very unoriginalist decision of the 
Supreme Court in Bradwell v. Illinois.74 Myra Bradwell passed the bar 
examination in Illinois but was denied her right to pursue a lawful 
occupation. What occupation could be more “lawful” than the practice of 
law? A living constitutionalist Supreme Court denied her claim on the 
basis of precedent, but Chief Justice Salmon Chase dissented. The Chief 
Justice was very ill and did not write an opinion, but if he had, I believe 
that it would have been an originalist dissent, arguing that Myra Bradwell 
was a citizen and therefore entitled to practice law.75 
Here is how one recent scholar summarizes the originalist case for 
Bradwell’s claim: 
The privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States include 
a set of rights termed basic rights. These basic rights are a set of 
fundamental civil rights, which includes the rights in the first eight 
amendments to the constitution, the rights of Article I sections 9 and 10, 
and the right to own property, enter into contracts, and pursue a lawful 
occupation: all of the basic rights (whether conceived of as natural or  
71. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
72. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
73. Compare RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (rev. ed. 2014) with 
KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF 
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2014). 
74. Bradwell v. People of State of Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872). 
75. For a description of the case, see M. Frances Rooney, The Privileges or Immunities Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and an Originalist Defense of Gender Nondiscrimination, 15 GEO. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 737 (2017). 
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common law rights) must be extended to women given the original 
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
Because these rights are granted to all citizens, discrimination on the 
basis of gender as to these rights is an unconstitutional violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment unless it is true as a matter of fact that women 
are not capable of exercising these rights. This is the same principle that 
was used to deny women the right to practice law in Bradwell, on the 
grounds that they were unable to do so as a matter of fact. Likewise, 
children, who are obviously citizens but are not factually able to enter 
into valid contracts of their own volition, are still protected by this grant 
of rights as a matter of law. Though many in the nineteenth century may 
have believed that women were intellectually unable to exercise them, 
this is clearly, demonstrably false. If women lacked the ability to 
exercise one of these substantive basic rights, preventing them from 
doing so would not be a constitutional violation. Likewise, if an activity 
in question is not one of these substantive basic rights, preventing them 
from doing so is also not a constitutional violation.76 
At this point, I imagine that some readers will object that I am trying to 
pull a fast one. Many of the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would have been quite surprised and even appalled by Myra 
Bradwell’s argument. Don’t originalists believe that their intentions 
should govern us today? Surprisingly, the answer is no, no, no! 
Even if the Supreme Court had not gutted the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause in Slaughterhouse, the Court would probably have 
denied Myra Bradwell’s claim. That is because the Justices (like most 
male Americans at the time) believed that women lacked the intellectual 
capacity to practice law. But that is a belief about facts and not about 
original meaning. Originalists believe that the original meaning of the 
constitutional text is fixed and that it binds us, but they do not believe that 
the framers’ beliefs about facts are binding: that would be just plain silly. 
The meaning of a legal text is one thing. The facts to which that text 
applies is quite another. Originalism requires that we apply the original 
public meaning of the constitutional text to the facts as they exist today 
given current understandings. Let me say that another way: originalism 
rejects the idea that our view of the facts to which the constitution applies 
should be frozen in time by the beliefs of the framers about circumstances 
that no longer exist. 
Once we combine the original meaning of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause with the truth about women’s intellectual capacities, 
76. Id. at 32-33. 
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Bradwell v. Illinois is an easy case from an originalist perspective. Sadly, 
even if the Supreme Court had embraced the original public meaning of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, it would not have helped Myra 
Bradwell herself, because of epistemic injustice:77 the Justices (aside from 
Chief Justice Chase) were not prepared to listen to women about their own 
intellectual capacities. It is remarkable that even in 1873, the contention 
that the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected 
women like Myra Bradwell from irrational discrimination was not beyond 
the pale. 
But society eventually did come to realize that the intellectual 
capacities of women were equal to those of men. By the time the 
Nineteenth Amendment was ratified in 1920, the change in factual beliefs 
had crystallized into constitutional law. Had the Court followed the 
original meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, it could have 
given us a powerful gender equality jurisprudence about fifty years before 
the Supreme Court’s living constitutionalist jurisprudence of the 1970s. 
2. The Technicalities of Pleading and the Seventh Amendment
The next surprise is only exciting to law geeks. The original meaning 
of the Seventh Amendment would require the Supreme Court to overrule 
its notorious decisions in Twombly78 and Iqbal,79 two pleading decisions 
that have split the Court along ideological lines. If you aren’t a lawyer, 
you might say, “Who cares about the technicalities of pleading?” But all 
Americans should care about the role of the civil jury. Twombly and Iqbal 
introduced a new pleading standard that gives judges power to dismiss 
cases before the plaintiff even has a chance to conduct discovery and 
thereby insures that claims will never come before a jury. This has 
important implications: plaintiff’s lawyers know that the ability to get to 
a jury is critical. 
Civil procedure scholars have complained about plausibility 
77. The concept of epistemic injustice has been developed in a substantial literature. See, e.g., 
MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF KNOWING 27-28 (2007) 
(developing idea of systemic testimonial injustice); JOSÉ MEDINA, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF 
RESISTANCE: GENDER AND RACIAL OPPRESSION, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE, AND RESISTANT 
IMAGINATIONS (2012) (developing a theory of epistemic injustice); Alison Bailey, The Unlevel 
Knowing Field: An Engagement with Dotson’s Third-Order Epistemic Oppression, 3 SOCIAL 
EPISTEMOLOGY REVIEW AND REPLY COLLECTIVE  62 (2014), http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1Gs 
[https://perma.cc/5A9Q-RC2X ] (developing conception of an unlevel knowing field); Kristie 
Dotson, Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing, 26 HYPATIA 236 (2011) 
(developing notion of testimonial quieting). 
78. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545–46 (2007). 
79. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
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pleading as a matter of the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure—and, in my opinion, they are right to do so on grounds that 
are essentially originalist in nature. But there is a more fundamental 
problem that emerges if we take the original meaning of the Seventh 
Amendment seriously. The Seventh Amendment states: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law.80 
At common law, plaintiffs had a right to a jury trial if they survived a 
demurrer. But the common law demurrer did not allow for judges to assess 
the plausibility of the plaintiff’s factual allegations. From an originalist 
perspective, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Rule 12 in Twiqbal (as 
the two cases are known together) seems to violate the Seventh 
Amendment’s command to preserve the right to jury trial in suits at 
common law.81 
Speaking of civil procedure, the original meaning of the Seventh 
Amendment is likely to have many implications that ought to be 
welcomed by progressives and liberals. Two of these are especially 
important: mandatory arbitration and summary judgment. The liberals on 
the Supreme Court were sharply critical of the Supreme Court’s decisions 
that the Federal Arbitration Act precluded class action suits in cases where 
the plaintiffs had agreed to an arbitration clause in a form contract. The 
Seventh Amendment may invalidate these clauses, because it is not clear 
that they were valid under the common law in 1791.82 The Supreme Court 
has upheld the use of summary judgment to prevent cases from getting to 
a jury, but scholars have argued that the modern practice of summary 
judgment is contrary to the original meaning of the Seventh 
Amendment.83 
80. U.S. CONST. amend. 7. 
81. Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards on to
Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 262 (2009) (“[I]t is unconstitutional to give a judge 
the power to weigh the factual heft of a complaint at the outset of a civil case and to dismiss it as 
insufficient.”). 
82. For an investigation of these issues that does not use the resources of originalism, see Judge 
Craig Smith and Judge Eric V. Moyé, Outsourcing American Civil Justice: Mandatory Arbitration 
Clauses in Consumer and Employment Contracts, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 281, 282 (2012). 
83. The key work has been done by Suja Thomas, who does not employ the resources of the
most sophisticated forms of public meaning originalism. See SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING 
AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, 
AND GRAND JURIES (2016); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. 
L. REV. 139 (2007). 
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You may be thinking to yourself, “Hey! If the Seventh Amendment 
is so important, then why didn’t Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas say 
so?” Fair question. I cannot answer on their behalf, but I do know this: the 
advocates in many of the recent cases haven’t bothered to make originalist 
arguments. Perhaps, this is because they are ignorant of the original 
meaning of the right to jury trial in civil cases. I can almost guarantee very 
few of them studied the original meaning of any provision of the 
Constitution in law school. Or perhaps, the failure to present originalist 
arguments stems from the fact that most liberal and progressive advocates 
just don’t see the possibility that original meaning could favor their side. 
3. Mass Incarceration and the Eighth Amendment
What? Mass incarceration! How is the original public meaning of the 
constitutional text of any help in dealing with what is surely the most 
important challenge facing the criminal justice system? The answer may 
lie in the text of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution: “Excessive 
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.”84The best originalist work on the Eighth 
Amendment has been done by John Stinneford.85 He discovered 
something quite surprising about the meaning of the word “unusual.” The 
contemporary meaning of the word “unusual” focuses on frequency. For 
example, Merriam Webster defines “unusual” as “uncommon” or 
“rare.”86 
But that was not the meaning in 1791 when the Eighth Amendment 
was framed and ratified. Here is Stinneford’s description of the original 
public meaning of “unusual”: 
In conclusion, American courts of the first half of the nineteenth century 
shared the Framers’ understanding that the word “unusual” in the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause meant “contrary to long usage.” They 
generally upheld punishments that were consonant with common law 
precedent and were willing to strike down those that were not, even if 
such punishments did not involve the infliction of physical pain or 
degradation. Moreover, American courts in this period demonstrated 
awareness that even traditional common law punishments could become 
84. U.S. CONST. amend. 8. 
85. John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar 
to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1745 (2008); John F. Stinneford, The Original 
Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 506 (2017). 
86. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unusual 
[https://perma.cc/PD63-S459] (last visited May 21, 2018). 
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unusual if they actually fell out of usage.87 
Stinneford marshals impressive evidence for this thesis and explains how 
the original meaning of unusual fit the eighteenth-century understanding 
of the nature of the common law. 
What does this have to do with mass incarceration? Given the 
original meaning of “cruel,” there is no question that prison sentences that 
last for decades are “cruel” as that word was understood by the public in 
the eighteenth century: “The original meaning of the word ‘cruel’ in the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is unjustly harsh.”88 Judged 
against the relevant baseline—punishment practices that were long in use 
and approved by the common law in 1791—there is a powerful argument 
that modern multiyear sentences are both “cruel” and “unusual.” Of 
course, there are many reasons for the emergence of mass incarceration, 
but the imposition of lengthy sentences is clearly one of the root causes. 
How would the argument go? I imagine that it would look something 
like this: 
Mass incarceration is founded on sentencing practices that constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment—not because of any fancy new theory, 
not because of changing values and circumstances, not because we have 
come to realize that mass incarceration is bad policy. The carceral state 
is unconstitutional because it depends on punishments (long prison 
sentences) that are harsh, unjust, and were contrary to long usage in 
1791. Mass incarceration cannot be sustained given the original public 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 
I am not sure that this argument works. I am not an Eighth Amendment 
specialist, and I have done neither the corpus linguistics work nor careful 
study of the constitutional record. But I do find Stinneford’s surprising 
theory to be plausible and if he is right, then the original public meaning 
of the Eighth Amendment may well have surprising implications for our 
practices of punishment. 
This article is entitled “Surprising Originalism,” and I have been 
pointing out some of the surprising implications of originalism. But don’t 
get me wrong. originalism has implications that are unsurprising and 
many of these implications will be welcome to conservatives but 
anathema to liberals. For example, I think it is likely that the original 
public meaning of Article One would be inconsistent with the modern 
expansive interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Clause. I suspect that 
87. Stinneford, Original Meaning of “Unusual,” supra note 85, at 1814-15. 
88. Stinneford, Original Meaning of “Cruel,” supra note 85, at 506. 
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the original public meaning of the grants of “legislative power” to 
Congress, “judicial power” to Article Three courts, and “executive 
power” to the President is difficult to reconcile with independent 
administrative agencies that combine legislative and judicial power with 
executive power that is almost entirely free of presidential direction. The 
political valence of public meaning originalism is a mixed bag: there is 
something for everyone, but everything for no one. 
C. What About Segregation? 
At this point, I imagine that many readers will want to know about 
the implications of originalism for segregation, Plessy v. Ferguson,89 and 
Brown v. Board of Education.90 Brown is what constitutional scholars call 
a “canonical” case, by which they mean that Brown is considered a fixed 
point, a case that is surely right.91 Plessy is an “anti-canonical” case—also 
a fixed point, but on the “wrongly decided” side of line.92 Given these 
starting points, originalism must be rejected if it is inconsistent with 
Brown or if it would endorse Plessy. Discussion of these issues by living 
constitutionalist scholars usually begins and ends with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause does not enter into the conversation. 
What does originalism have to say about Brown and Plessy? The first 
step is to identify the relevant parts of the constitutional text. And now 
another surprise! The Equal Protection Clause is the wrong place to look. 
Why? Here is a clue: contemporary understandings of the Equal 
Protection Clause almost always cut off the final three words “of the 
laws.” What did “equal protection of the laws” mean? The primary 
function of what we should call the Protection of Laws Clause was to 
ensure that the former slaves would receive the same protection of their 
personal security and property as other persons. The clause accomplishes 
this end by requiring states to provide every person protection of the laws 
on an equal basis—”equal protection of the laws.” Another surprise is that 
reading renders an affirmative duty of protection on state governments: 
89. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
90. Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
91. See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 681–82 (2005) (Some canonical cases, like Brown v. Board of 
Education, are uniformly understood as data points that any serious theory of constitutional law must 
justify and explain.); Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 
52 Rutgers L. Rev. 383 (2000). 
92. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 412 (2011). 
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this result would undermine the controversial DeShaney case.93 In that 
case, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, “[T]he Due Process Clauses 
generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where 
such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of 
which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”94 But from 
an originalist perspective, the Court was looking at the wrong clause. The 
place to look for an affirmative obligation for government to provide 
persons protections of the laws is the full Equal Protection of the Laws 
Clause, not merely the Equal Protection Clause, leaving “of the Laws” 
out. That clause does seem to require “protection of the laws.” But it was 
not addressed by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
Therefore, the Equal Protection Clause is the wrong place to look. 
Where is the right place? A good way to answer that question is to 
examine what actually happened in Plessy v. Ferguson.95 
The following is my understanding of Plessy v. Ferguson, but keep 
in mind that I am not an expert and I have not done the necessary work to 
assure you that this account is correct. When Homer Plessy challenged the 
Louisiana statute that required the segregation of railroad cars, his primary 
argument was based on the Privileges or Immunities Clause.96 This may 
come as a surprise to many law students who come away from class 
assuming that Plessy was all about the Equal Protection Clause.97 
Restated in modern terms, the essence of Plessy’s argument was that 
access to a public carrier (a railroad) was one of the privileges or 
immunities (basic rights) that states may not deny to any citizen.98 Plessy 
v. Ferguson dismissed this claim out of hand, relying on the
Slaughterhouse Cases. If the Plessy Court had followed the original 
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and if it had not had 
erroneous factual beliefs about the mixing of the races, Plessy could have 
93. For a brief review of the issues, see Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-
Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 604 (2006).  
94. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). 
95. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
96. See CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
152-62, 164-68 (1987) (citing Brief for Plaintiff in Error, submitted by Albion Tourgée and James C. 
Walker, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Brief for Plaintiff in Error, submitted by S.F. 
Phillips and F.D. McKenny, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); see also Barry P. McDonald, 
A Reluctant Apology for Plessy: A Response to Akhil Amar, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 91, 99 (2011). 
97. Michael Klarman’s The Plessy Era does not even mention the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. See Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303 (1998). 
98. As noted earlier in connection with gender equality, there is a serious dispute about the
original public meaning of the phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” See 
supra note 7073. 
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prevailed, and Jim Crow might never have gotten off the ground.99 
Nonetheless, a living constitutionalist Supreme Court rejected 
Plessy’s claims: the separate but equal doctrine reflected the Court’s view 
that segregation was consistent with what we now would call 
“contemporary circumstances and values.” It was not until Brown v. 
Board that the Supreme Court reversed course: circumstances and values 
had changed. The Brown Court did not even consider the possibility that 
the relevant constitutional provision was the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause. 
The world of 1954 was substantially different than the world of 1868 
when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. Originalism is committed 
to the public meaning of the constitutional text, and the public meaning is 
fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified. But originalism is 
not committed to the patently ridiculous proposition that facts about the 
world are fixed or the even more ludicrous position that the application of 
the public meaning to current facts should be guided by the factual beliefs 
of the public at the time constitutional provisions were framed and 
ratified—much less the absolutely insane idea that the false beliefs of the 
framers about facts bind us today. That is why the original meaning of the 
privileges and immunities clause can support gender equality rights—
even though most men thought that the intellectual capacity of women 
was childlike and therefore women could be treated like children by the 
law. Originalism is committed to the constitutional text—not the factual 
beliefs of the people who wrote the text. At this point, I hope that readers 
will no longer find that conclusion surprising. 
So, what about Brown v. Board of Education? Was it supported by 
the original public meaning of the constitutional text given the facts as 
they were known in 1954? This is a large question. The eminent 
99. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1462–63 (1992): 
The Supreme Court upheld a railroad car segregation law in Plessy v. Ferguson. Although 
symmetrical, the law restricted the right to contract by forbidding a white citizen from 
buying a ticket on a car that carried blacks. It also limited the even more fundamental 
privilege of natural liberty because the black passenger was not allowed to walk into the 
white train car. The law should have been held invalid. The same is true with respect to 
segregated public education. Schools financed by general taxation are very probably a 
privilege of citizens. If so, to give individuals of different races different versions of the 
privilege would constitute an abridgment. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). In my opinion much work needs to be done on the original public meaning of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but as opposed to Klarman, Harrison actually does have a theory 
of the meaning of the clause and an argument that this meaning is inconsistent with Plessy and 
consistent with Brown. 
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constitutional scholar Michael McConnell stated in a subsequent 
summary of his famous article:100 
As originally proposed by Senator Charles Sumner, the Civil Rights Act 
guaranteed equality in access to various types of public accommodation, 
including railroads, inns, theaters, steamboats, cemeteries, and—most 
controversially—public schools.101 
* * 
In numerous votes between introduction of the bill in 1870 and passage 
of a stripped-down version of the bill in 1875, majorities in both Houses 
of Congress supported the desegregation position. At the high-water 
mark in May and June of 1874, the bill passed the Senate by a vote of 
29-16 and won the support of the House (on a procedural vote) by a 
margin of 141-72. That comes close to two-thirds. The margin of victory 
among supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment was far higher. 
Moreover, both Houses consistently rejected versions of the bill that 
would have allowed separate-but-equal facilities. The bill failed only 
because procedural rules in the House, permitting filibustering and 
dilatory motions, made a two-thirds vote necessary. Supporters of the 
bill came tantalizingly close, but could never break that barrier. On one 
fateful date in June, 1874, the switch of just two votes would have 
carried the measure, and the requirement of school desegregation would 
have been written into the law. Would history not have looked different 
if those two votes had changed? 
But the bill, in its strong version, failed. The Democrats were able to 
stave off action on the bill in the House throughout 1874. Then, in the 
elections of that November, the Democrats won a landslide victory. 
When the lame duck Congress met in early 1875, the Republican 
majority was demoralized. Even then, their last great project was 
passage of the civil rights bill. The Democrats were willing to acquiesce 
in the bill if it were amended to permit separate-but-equal schools, but 
the Republicans angrily denounced this effort to introduce what they 
called “invidious discrimination in the laws of this country.” They 
preferred to delete coverage of schools from the bill altogether, rather 
than to countenance a separate-but-equal provision for schools. That did 
not mean that their constitutional interpretation had changed, but only 
that their political power to achieve enforcement of that interpretation 
had changed. Supporters of desegregated education still had hopes for 
 100.  Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 
947 (1995). 
 101.  Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 459 (1996). 
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the courts. James Monroe, Republican from Ohio, stated that black 
Americans “think their chances for good schools will be better under the 
Constitution with the protection of the courts than under a bill containing 
such provisions as this.” 
Defeat of the schools provision was fateful as a legislative matter, but 
viewing the course of deliberations as an exercise in constitutional 
interpretation by persons well situated to know and understand the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the evidence of original 
meaning survives the defeat of the bill. Large majorities of both houses 
of Congress, and even larger majorities of supporters of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, concluded that it forbade de jure segregation of public 
schools. That fact puts to rest the notion that the Supreme Court had to 
disregard the original meaning of the Amendment in order to “do the 
right thing” in Brown.102 
In this very short article, I cannot state the full case, but I hope this 
extended quotation gives you a lively sense of McConnell’s argument.103 
More recent originalist scholarship reaches a similar conclusion on the 
basis of additional evidence and explicit focus on public meaning.104 
If you are in the “in crowd,” you were not surprised by my invocation 
102.  Id. at 463–64. 
 103.  The argument would be stated differently if it were made today using the state-of-the-art 
version of public meaning originalism. 
104.  Steven G. Calabresi and Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education, 
2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429, 436–37 (2014)  
We conclude that by 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, citizens in 
thirty out of thirty-seven states had a fundamental right to a public school education that 
was a privilege or immunity of state citizenship. As a result, the Fourteenth Amendment 
forbade racial segregation in public schools from the moment it was adopted. Thus, the 
original public meaning of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited racial 
segregation in public schools.  
The only serious engagement with Calabresi and Perl’s argument is found in an article by Ronald 
Turner. See Ronald Turner, The Problematics of the Brown-Is-Originalist Project, 23 J.L. & POL’Y 
591, 637 (2015). Turner’s argument is not fully articulated, but it can be reconstructed as the claim 
that: (1) the right to attend a public school is a “social” right in contradistinction to “political” and 
“civil” rights, (2) social rights are excluded from the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States, and therefore (3) Brown is not supported by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. These issues 
are complex and even a cursory discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. My sense is that it is 
not clear that the phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” had the same 
communicative content as “civil rights” and that the categorical division between “civil,” “political,” 
and “social” rights was highly uncertain at the time. If privileges or immunities include the important 
or fundamental rights of citizens that are legally enforceable and if there was in 1954 a general 
prevailing and legally enforceable right to public education that was then fundamental or important, 
then the original public meaning of the text would support the decision in Brown v. Board. In this 
Article, I am not claiming that this view is correct. Rather my claim is that the widely accepted belief 
that it has been demonstrated that Brown is inconsistent with the original public meaning of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause is not well supported. 
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of McConnell’s argument—which is well known to constitutional 
scholars who debate the merits of originalism. And it is likely that you 
believe that Michael Klarman proved that McConnell was wrong in an 
equally famous article.105 And you might even believe that Klarman’s 
article addressed the original public meaning of the constitutional text and 
demonstrated that it supported segregation of public schools. Some might 
say that is the “conventional wisdom.” 
At this point, sophisticated readers surely see the surprise that is 
coming.106 Klarman wrote his article in 1995 and, like most constitutional 
scholars at the time, he seems to have been unaware of the existence of 
public meaning originalism. The phrase “public meaning” does not appear 
in his article—not even once. The article does mention the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause once and only once,107 but it does not quote the clause 
or interpret the language of the clause, much less undertake an 
investigation of the public meaning of the text. Klarman offers no 
evidence of the public meaning of the clause. I doubt that in the 1990s, 
Klarman had even a vague idea that originalists were seeking the 
communicative content conveyed to the public by the constitutional 
text—no wonder that he did not discuss the public meaning of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. As an exercise in public meaning 
originalism, Klarman’s article is not a failure, because he does not even 
try.108 Klarman’s principal argument is that the public opposed school 
integration, but this evidence does not even establish that the original 
expected application of the Privileges or Immunities Clause would have 
supported Plessy and opposed Brown. 
Klarman’s argument does not take into account the distinction 
between original public meaning (which is fixed) and beliefs about facts 
(which do change over time). Even if Klarman had produced an argument 
that demonstrated that the public believed that the Privileges or 
 105.  Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to 
Professor McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881, 1883 (1995) (stating “the four principal difficulties with 
McConnell’s originalist defense of Brown based on the 1875 CRA debates” are “his focus on legal 
principle rather than actual practice, his prioritization of congressional sentiment over popular 
opinion, his failure adequately to consider the possibility of values changing over time, and his 
equation of ‘full and equal enjoyment’ language with integrationism”). 
 106.  An example of a sophisticated approach to Brown and originalism is found in Michael C. 
Dorf, The Undead Constitution, supra note 14 (recognizing that it is original-expected applications 
originalism that may be inconsistent with Brown). 
107.  Klarman, supra note 105, at 1889. 
 108.  The failure to engage public meaning originalism’s implications for the relationship 
between the Privileges and Immunities Clause has been repeated more recently. See Ronald 
Turner, Justice Antonin Scalia’s Flawed Originalist Justification for Brown v. Board of Education, 9 
WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REV. 179, 193 (2017). 
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Immunities Clause was consistent with segregation, his argument would 
not be complete until he examines the reasons for this belief and shows 
that they were based on the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause and not on factual beliefs that we now know are false. Klarman’s 
article barely mentions the Privileges or Immunities Clause: it does not 
even hint at a theory of its meaning. 
The notion that originalism is inconsistent with Brown has become 
an article of faith among scholars. Richard Fallon, one of the most careful 
and fair-minded constitutional theorists, wrote in 2018, “Most of those 
who have examined the evidence have concluded that the original 
contextual meaning permitted segregated schools to survive.”109 Fallon’s 
phrase “original contextual meaning” is his way of expressing the same 
notion that most scholars call “original public meaning.” But in fact, there 
is no scholarship of which I am aware (and no evidence that Fallon 
cites110) that demonstrates that the original public meaning of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause is consistent with segregation given the 
actual facts—as opposed to false factual beliefs in 1868. Let me say it one 
more time: Klarman’s article makes no arguments that demonstrate that 
Brown is inconsistent with the original public meaning of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause. None. Not one. Nada. Nil. Zero. Zip.111 
109.  RICHARD FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 52 (2018). 
 110.  The footnote for the passage quoted at text accompanying note 109 reads in full as follows: 
“21. The sole prominent exception is Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation 
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1885-93 (1995).”  Fallon, Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court, 
supra note 109, at 186 n.21. The next footnote is to Klarman, supra note105. Fallon is not alone here. 
As William Eskridge observed, “The consensus among law professors is that Brown is hard to defend 
on originalist grounds.” William N. Eskridge Jr., Original Meaning and Marriage Equality, 52 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1067, 1088 n.96 (2015). (A quick aside: Eskridge himself does not endorse the consensus.)  
The point here is that this consensus is based on work by Klarman that did not engage with public 
meaning originalism. There may be a consensus that Brown is inconsistent with the original public 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it turns out that the scholarship on which the consensus 
is based does not address the  Privileges or Immunities Clause. It seems likely that Fallon was unaware 
of John Harrison’s work on the Privileges or Immunities Clause which predated the McConnell-
Klarman debate. See Harrison, supra note 99. Fallon’s discussion is framed in terms of the Equal 
Protection Clause and does not even mention the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See Fallon, supra 
note 109, at 52. Fallon does not discuss other work, including that of Steven Calabresi and Michael 
Perl, see Calabresi & Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education, supra note 104, but it is 
possible that Fallon was aware of this work but did not consider it “prominent.” 
111.  This is not to say that Klarman’s evidence has no bearing on the original public meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Evidence that the public opposed school integration is secondary 
evidence that the public would have expected that the application of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause would not have invalidated the segregation of public schools. It is not very strong evidence, 
because it seems unlikely that members of the public actually had a specific expectation one way or 
the other regarding this issue. Expectations are mental states, and there is no evidence of which I am 
aware of the existence of such mental states with respect to the application of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause to school segregation. It seems much more likely that most members of the public 
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Perhaps Klarman can be excused for failing to understand the state 
of originalist theory in 1995. I hope so, because I was equally ignorant. In 
my own case, I am not sure that I can claim a defense of excusable neglect. 
If I had bothered to read the key texts, I would have known about the shift 
to public meaning. Since I was teaching constitutional law, the neglect is 
hard to excuse. Be that as it may, there is now no excuse for the belief that 
Klarman’s 1995 article demonstrated that Brown v. Board is inconsistent 
with the original public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause—
that belief can only be a product of epistemic negligence. Undoubtedly, 
there is more to say about that topic, but the case that Brown v. Board is 
inconsistent with the original public meaning of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause has yet to be made. 
At this point, let us take a step back. Our investigation of the possible 
implications of the Privileges or Immunities Clause for gender equality 
and segregation has revealed a surprising fact: the people who draft and 
ratify a constitutional provision can themselves be surprised by its 
applications! But how are surprising applications possible? Anyone who 
has ever drafted a rule or policy is well familiar with the phenomenon of 
unintended consequences. You write it down on paper and you think you 
know what the effects will be, but then you are confronted with a case you 
did not anticipate, and you come to realize that the rule that you wrote 
does something you did not anticipate and don’t particularly like. If you 
had it to do over again, you would write the rule differently. 
The problem of unintended consequences looms larger once we take 
facts into account. You write a rule for today’s facts, but tomorrow’s facts 
are different. You write a rule based on your belief about the facts, but 
then it turns out that you were wrong—the facts are different than you 
believed them to be. And so, the very rule that you wrote has unintended 
consequences—consequences that you did not even imagine when you 
wrote the rule. And this is especially true when you write a rule in very 
general and abstract language. Consider the text of the Privileges or 
had no belief either way with respect to this question—because they simply had not thought about it 
at all. Moreover, original expected application beliefs do not constitute original public meaning; they 
are not binding. Original expected applications do, however, provide evidence that is relevant to 
public meaning. For example, if a constitutional provision is ambiguous and one interpretation is 
consistent with application expectations and the other is not, then the expectations are evidence in 
favor of the interpretation with which they are consistent. But in order to make the argument, Klarman 
would need to provide an account of the communicative content of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause that includes an ambiguity, demonstrate the existence of the application expectations, and then 
show that this evidence supports the disambiguation that is inconsistent with the outcome in Brown. 
The distinction between original expectations and original meaning was first articulated in Mark 
Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 573-74 (1998); see 
also Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, supra note 1, at 414. 
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Immunities Clause again: “No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States.”112 Is it any wonder that such powerful language could have 
unintended consequences, given changing circumstances and changing 
beliefs about the facts to which the clause is to be applied? 
But what if Brown v. Board cannot be justified on originalist 
grounds? This question sounds simple and invites a simplistic answer: if 
Brown v. Board is inconsistent with originalism, then originalism is 
obviously wrong. But not so fast. Racial segregation was consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s understanding of contemporary circumstances and 
values for some seventy years: if living constitutionalism gave us Plessy, 
what then? Again, the simple question invites a simplistic answer—living 
constitutionalism is obviously wrong. Astute readers may now realize that 
we are on a slippery slope, because every constitutional theory can be 
shown to lead to unacceptable outcomes in some circumstances. Living 
constitutionalism yields the outcomes produced by contemporary 
circumstances and values—as they are understood by the Justices of the 
Supreme Court at the time a particular case is decided. A living 
constitutionalist court that believes in segregation will gut the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the name of contemporary circumstances and values. 
Indeed, Klarman’s argument about Brown v. Board actually provides a 
devastating critique of living constitutionalism, even as it fails to engage 
public meaning originalism. Honestly, I didn’t see that surprise coming. 
These points may now seem obvious to some readers, but it will 
nonetheless come as a surprise to many critics of originalism who are 
inclined to say, “Originalism? Brown v. Board. Game over!” Surprisingly, 
though, the game is not over. It would be more accurate to say that it has 
barely begun. 
D. That’s Not Originalism! Or Is It? 
At this point, some readers may be in a state of shock. I seem to be 
suggesting that their preconceptions about “originalism” are wrong—not 
just a little wrong, but really truly deeply wrong. Not only that, but 
originalism might well have very surprising implications—some of which 
might be progressive or liberal if judged by modern standards. One 
possible reaction to that state of affairs is to say something like the 
following: 
Okay, that theory you are talking about is not so bad, but that is not what 
112.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2. 
268 CONLAWNOW [9:235 
I mean by “originalism.” “Originalism” is “What would James 
Madison do?” “Originalism” is outcomes I reject. “Originalism” is a 
conservative ideology. Don’t confuse me by changing the definition of 
“originalism.” I might be okay with the idea that courts should respect 
the public meaning of the constitutional text. Can’t we call that 
something else? Maybe “moderate living constitutionalism” or “new 
textualism” or “common sense constitutionalism.” All my friends are 
against originalism. I don’t want to be put in the position of explaining 
my sympathies with “originalism.” I need to be able to say, 
“Originalism is crazy.” 
Believe me, I sympathize. I am tempted by Professor Michael Dorf’s 
suggestion that originalism needs “rebranding.”113 But in the end, I think 
this move would simply be dishonest—and that it wouldn’t fool anyone 
for long. The mainstream of originalism has been public meaning 
originalism for more than thirty years. It is just too late to pretend 
otherwise. 
IV. AND THE SURPRISING JUSTIFICATIONS
If you are still with me, then you might have been struck by the 
following thought: 
I see that originalism is not so bad, but why should I care? For the sake 
of argument, let’s assume that originalism makes sense as a theory and 
that it might actually lead to good results in some cases and bad results 
in others. Living constitutionalism does that too. And I don’t see how 
originalism would support some of the results that matter a lot to me. 
What about Obergefell114 and the right to marriage? What about Roe v. 
Wade115 and the right to choose? The living constitutionalists on the 
court supported those decisions, and the originalists opposed them. Why 
shouldn’t I support the constitutional theory that enables the Supreme 
Court to reach progressive (or liberal) outcomes on the issues that are 
most important to me? 
Indeed, many of us may be “single issue voters” when it comes to 
constitutional theory—with a hot button issue that we deeply care about, 
the temptation is to choose the constitutional theory that produces the 
“right outcome” on that single constitutional question. Or perhaps, you 
113.  Michael Dorf, Advice to Conscientious Originalists: Rebrand, DORF ON LAW, Apr. 13, 
2017. http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/04/advice-to-conscientious-originalists.html#more 
[https://perma.cc/J63T-UGNY. 
114.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, (2015). 
115.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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would join a coalition of groups, each of which cares most about a single 
constitutional question and then combines with the others to seek the 
appointment of Justices that will advance the agenda of the coalition. Why 
shouldn’t constitutional law be the outcome of action by social 
movements with political agendas?116 This question about originalism 
raises important questions, but once again, the answers may come as a 
surprise. 
A. Thought Experiment: “Bad” Living Constitutionalists 
Let’s start with a thought experiment: 
Imagine a Supreme Court that has adopted an undisguised form of living 
constitutionalism: all of the Justices believe that constitutional issues 
should be resolved on the basis of “constitutional values”—their 
fundamental beliefs about the principles of morality that should govern 
society. Now imagine that the Court consists of Justices who have values 
with which you disagree. If you are a Democrat, imagine nine very 
conservative Republican Justices. If you are a Republican, imagine nine 
very liberal Democratic Justices. They vote their values across the 
board in constitutional cases, and you disagree with those values. From 
your perspective they are “bad” living constitutionalists. 
Does this thought experiment make you nervous? You are pro-choice, but 
the Supreme Court consists of nine pro-life Justices—they hold that state 
laws permitting abortion violate the constitution because they violate the 
constitutional right to life of the unborn. You support campaign finance 
reform, but the Supreme Court holds that the constitution creates an 
absolute right to make anonymous and unlimited donations to candidates 
for elected office. 
Or from the other side of the ideological divide, you believe in the 
right to bear arms, but the Supreme Court holds that state laws permitting 
private ownership of guns of any type violates the due process clause 
because guns deprive persons of their lives without due process of law. 
You believe that the decision, whether of a priest or rabbi, to perform a 
marriage ceremony may properly be limited to those who are permitted to 
marry under the religious doctrine of the faith of the officiant, but the 
Supreme Court holds that marriage officiants (religious or secular) must 
 116.  For examples of academic discussion of the relationship of constitutional change to social 
movements, see Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 MICH. 
L. REV. 877 (2013); Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional 
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, 
and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006). 
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provide their services to all comers, whatever their faith, prior marital 
status, or gender-orientations. 
The thought experiment might provoke the following thought: 
No, I do not want the Justices with values opposed to mine to enact their 
values into constitutional law. I only want living constitutionalism when 
the Justices share my values. I am willing to concede that originalism is 
sometimes a good idea, but only when the Court is controlled by Justice 
who do not share my values—”bad” living constitutionalists. 
Would this work? Can there be a stable constitutional jurisprudence that 
relies on double standards—one set of rules for your friends, another set 
for your enemies? 
B. The Risks of Politicization 
Here is one problem with a double standard (living constitutionalism 
for us, originalism for them): the other side is not likely to go along with 
it in the long run. It would be irrational to comply with the rule of law 
when your party controls the Court if the other side will defect when they 
are in power. This is, of course, an example of what is called the 
“prisoners’ dilemma” in game theory.117 The rational response to the 
prisoners’ dilemma is called “tit for tat,” but there is a problem with 
retaliation. What I believe is a proportionate response, you are likely to 
see as escalation. Once a downward spiral of politicization starts, it is hard 
to stop. 
Of course, living constitutionalism can try to disguise itself, hiding 
the role of the Justices’ personal beliefs about questions of value behind a 
curtain of legal mumbo jumbo. But at some point, Senators and Presidents 
are going to wise up and start playing hardball. When one party controls 
the Presidency and the Senate, they will select hardliners who will reliably 
vote their ideology and then shove them through the process. When there 
is divided government, the Senate may actually refuse to confirm Justices 
nominated by a President that they oppose—simply freezing the 
confirmation process until the next election. The membership of the Court 
might decline from nine to eight, or even seven or six, the number that is 
the bare minimum for a Supreme Court quorum.118 What if the 
membership fell to five? Things would go on, with the United States 
Courts of Appeal and the State Supreme Courts functioning as the 
117.  Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 007: The Prisoners’ Dilemma, LEGAL THEORY 
LEXICON, Apr. 13, 2017, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/
2003/10/legal_theory_le.html [https://perma.cc/S9TY-RSZF. 
118.  SUP. CT. R. 4. 
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effective courts of last resort on constitutional questions. 
In the world of a thoroughly politicized Supreme Court, it would be 
foolish for a party with control of the presidency and Congress to 
nominate candidates who elevated either precedent or the constitutional 
text over ideology. Given polarization in electoral politics and a 
politicized Supreme Court, the opportunity to lock in a majority for 
decades is just too good to pass up. The ideal nominee is a committed 
ideologue under the age of 40. 
But there are further moves and countermoves. If one party succeeds 
in stacking the court with nine ideologues who will serve for 40 or more 
years, the other party can expand the size of the Supreme Court from nine 
to 19, creating a ten to nine majority for their own partisans. Of course, 
why stop there? Once the other party gains a majority, then it will add 
however many seats are required to flip the balance again. There is no 
stopping point to this game: why not a Supreme Court of 99? Let me say 
it again: once started, a downward spiral of politicization is difficult to 
stop. 
You may say that I am crying wolf, but isn’t it obvious that the wolf 
is already at the door? Republicans blocked Merrick Garland. I’m sure 
you’ve heard talk about how Democrats will respond if they regain the 
Senate: no judicial nominations by a Republican President will be allowed 
to reach the floor. And the idea of court-packing has already been floated. 
Here is an example: 
It is impossible to know when Democrats might regain total control of 
the U.S. government. But assuming that American democracy survives 
the high-stakes stress test of a Trump presidency, they will at some point 
find themselves in the commanding position the Republicans are in now. 
And when they do, they should be prepared to pass a law expanding the 
number of seats on the Court from nine to 11 and to fill the two extra 
seats with the most divisive, outrageous liberals in the federal 
judiciary.119 
And one more: 
[I]t would be very unwise for Democrats to rule anything out. They 
should be careful not to blow up the power of judicial review without 
good cause. But if desperate Republicans try to establish an anti-
Democratic rearguard on the Supreme Court before they get swept out 
 119.  David Faris, “How Democrats can make Republicans pay for Justice Gorsuch,” THE 
WEEK, Mar. 20, 2017, http://theweek.com/articles/681352/how-democrats-make-republicans-pay-
justice-gorsuchrch [https://perma.cc/N4MA-VJ93]. 
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of office, Democrats have to leave all options on the table.120 
Pause just a moment to think about this statement. Serious consideration 
is being given to “blowing up the power of judicial review.” Does anyone 
believe that court packing by Democrats would be the last move? Is it 
remotely plausible to think that Republicans would not respond when they 
got the chance? The bottom of the downward spiral of politicization is not 
a pretty place. I leave it to the reader to imagine “the parade of 
horribles”—and I’m pretty sure that the parade you imagine will be 
horrible indeed. 
C. The Promise of Imperfect Originalism 
An originalist Supreme Court that views itself as bound by the 
constitutional text lowers the stakes. The replacement of a swing justice 
no longer provokes a battle royal for the constitutional future of the 
republic. The original meaning of the constitutional text leads to a mixed 
set of outcomes, conservative, libertarian, liberal, and progressive. As it 
becomes apparent that constitutional change cannot be accomplished via 
judicially imposed constitutional constructions that are constitutional 
amendments in disguise, social movements and constitutional reformers 
refocus their energies on the constitutional amendment process. 
Originalism may not be your first choice—that might be a Supreme Court 
of Platonic guardians who agree with your political ideology across the 
board—but originalism can be everyone’s second choice. 
We need to be realistic. Suppose that the court consists mostly of 
originalist Justices who believe that they are bound by the original 
meaning of the constitutional text and that they have an obligation to work 
hard to discover the original meaning in hard cases. These Justices attempt 
to control the temptation to engage in motivated reasoning. But they are 
not perfect. The world of perfect judicial neutrality is almost surely “pie 
in the sky.”121 Some slippage is probably inevitable. There undoubtedly 
would be cases where the Justices’ values would influence their 
conclusions about original meaning. But when we compare imperfect 
 120.  Scott Lemieux, Democrats: Prepare to Pack the Supreme Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 
May, 10, 2018, https://newrepublic.com/article/148358/democrats-prepare-pack-supreme-court 
[https://perma.cc/F2NX-ZJ7E]. 
121.  The phrase is from Joe Hill: 
You will eat, bye and bye, 
In that glorious land above the sky; 
Work and pray, live on hay, 
You’ll get pie in the sky when you die. 
JOE HILL, THE PREACHER AND THE SLAVE (1911). 
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originalism with living constitutionalist approaches that require the judges 
to rely on their own values when deciding constitutional cases, the result 
of the comparison is obvious. Imperfect originalism is better than a 
downward spiral of politicization that ends in the destruction of the rule 
of law. 
One more thing: my impression is that some critics of originalist 
constitutional theory equate originalism as a theory with the decisions of 
Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas—and in the near 
future this equation might extend to Justice Gorsuch. This identification 
of originalism with specific decisions by three Justices is problematic at 
many levels, starting with the fact that judges on a multimember collegial 
court dominated by living constitutionalists (both liberal and 
conservative) cannot as a practical matter write originalist opinions in 
every constitutional case. In many constitutional cases, none of the briefs 
engage in originalist analysis. On many constitutional issues, the academy 
has yet to provide input in the form of high-quality originalist scholarship 
informed by contemporary originalist thinking on both theory and 
methodology. When I speak of the promise of imperfect originalism, I do 
not mean to suggest that this promise has already been realized or that 
Antonin Scalia was a perfect paragon of originalist virtue. 
D. But Wait, There’s More 
The risk of politicization is one justification for originalism, but there 
are others.122 Originalism is consistent with the rule of law values—
stability, consistency, certainty, publicity, and uniformity of law. Living 
constitutionalism tends to undermine those values, especially in a nation 
closely divided along ideological lines where control of the presidency 
and the Senate can flip from election to election. If the Supreme Court is 
evenly divided, with four reliable liberals and four conservatives, then the 
replacement of the swing justice can lead to unpredictable changes in 
constitutional law. And any flip-flopping of the swing Justice will be 
especially damaging to the stability of the law. Moreover, a closely 
divided court is likely to produce compromise opinions with inconsistent 
reasoning—making it difficult for even excellent lawyers to say what the 
law actually is at any given point in time. 
Another line of argument for originalism focuses on legitimacy. 
Democratic legitimacy is a matter of degree, not an on or off switch. 
Deciding constitutional questions on the basis of the original meaning of 
122.  The case for originalism is examined in Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 1. 
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the text is not perfect: some parts of the constitution are very old and were 
adopted by democratic processes that excluded women, slaves, and others. 
But giving the authority to amend the Constitution to a majority vote of 
five members of a committee of nine individuals who serve life terms is 
even much worse—and by the way, Supreme Court Justices are hardly 
representative of America today. For one thing, this group only includes 
graduates of the Harvard and Yale Law Schools; for another, it fails to 
include members of dozens of important groups. If the right to vote were 
limited to citizens who resemble the Justices on the Supreme Court, we 
would not have a democracy in any meaningful sense of that concept. 
Moreover, giving judges the authority to make the law is inconsistent 
with widely shared views about their legitimate judicial role: that is why 
no nominee for a seat on the Supreme Court will admit that they believe 
they will have the authority to override the original meaning of the 
constitutional text. Even a committed living constitutionalist will be likely 
to say something like, “We are all originalists now.”123 Academics may 
write articles that openly advocate the view that the Supreme Court is not 
bound by the constitutional text,124 but that view is inconsistent with any 
mainstream understanding of the legitimate function of judges. This leads 
to another problem with living constitutionalism. Because living 
constitutionalist judges want to preserve their own legitimacy, they are 
likely to disguise the true reasons for their decisions. Originalism leads to 
transparency, but living constitutionalism tends to produce the opposite—
a jurisprudence of concealment and obfuscation. 
Here is one final thought experiment: 
In times of national crisis, a popular President induces the nation to 
convene a Constitutional Convention. He circumvents the Article V 
process and instead has Congress enact ordinary legislation giving him 
the power to nominate the members of the convention, subject to Senate 
confirmation. The House and Senate quickly pass the legislation. To 
ensure swift action, the Convention has only nine representatives and its 
amendments to the constitution become law immediately, without 
ratification by the States. 
Nine representatives to the Convention are nominated and confirmed. 
Five come from the President’s party, and four are from the opposition 
 123.  See David Ingram, On Day 2, Kagan Tries to Appease Republicans, NAT’L. LAW JOURNAL, 
June 30, 2010, https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202463159121/On-Day-2-Kagan-
Tries-to-Appease-Republicans/ [ https://perma.cc/4LND-BLQU] (“Sometimes they laid down very 
specific rules. Sometimes they laid down broad principles. Either way, we apply what they tried to do 
False In that way, we are all originalists.”). 
124.  DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010);  
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party. They all have graduated from Harvard or Yale Law School. There 
are five Roman Catholics, three Jews, one Protestant, one Latina, and 
one African American. Forty-five of the states are unrepresented at the 
convention. There are no Asians, no Native Americans, no one from the 
South or border states, and no one from the Pacific Northwest, Alaska, 
or Hawaii. There is no one who has ever held a job other than lawyer, 
judge, or law professor. 
The assumption was that the Convention would end after proposing 
amendments, but the members of the Convention are unable to agree on 
the actual text of amendments. They seem to be serving for life terms. 
Instead of amendments, they issue decrees that resolve particular 
constitutional issues. Sometimes their decrees are very narrow: they 
actually decide a disputed presidential election but propose no rules to 
govern future elections. Sometimes their decrees are very broad: they 
issue rules for police interrogations that spell out the words that must 
be said before questioning begins. They turn out to be flip-floppers. One 
year they create a right to abortion, but a few years later they decree 
that reasonable restrictions on abortion are permissible. States can 
criminalize flag burning one year, but then the Convention changes its 
mind. Sometimes, they cannot even agree on the wording of the decree 
and two or three groups issue inconsistent decrees. Critics howl, but the 
President directs all the Departments of the national government to 
comply with the decrees of the perpetual Constitutional Convention. 
Does this way of deciding constitutional issues comply with the rule of 
law? Could a nine-person perpetual constitutional convention claim 
democratic legitimacy? Would you say that this convention has the 
breadth of experience and background to represent the American people 
as a whole? And a final question: how different is a living constitutionalist 
Supreme Court from the perpetual Constitutional Convention? 
Originalism is imperfect. Living constitutionalism is imperfect as 
well. And I am sure that many opponents of originalism will object on the 
grounds that the version of living constitutionalism that I have been 
discussing is a caricature. Academics will complain that I have not 
discussed the sophisticated versions of living constitutionalism that have 
been developed by law professors. These include theories called 
“common law constitutionalism,”125 “constitutional pluralism,”126 and 
“moral readings.”127 The trick that such theories seek to perform is to give 
 125.  Id.; David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 57 (2015).  
 126.  Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1753, 1753 
(1994). 
127.  JAMES FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL READINGS 
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the Supreme Court the power to override the original meaning of the 
constitutional text while simultaneously keeping the Court within the 
bounds of the rule of law and democratic legitimacy. This feat of 
legerdemain is not easy to perform. I am skeptical of the idea that telling 
the Court to engage in moral readings of the constitutional text will 
provide meaningful constraint.128 I am dubious about the ability of the 
common law method to provide substantial restrictions on the policy 
views of the Justices.129 I am suspicious of the claim that judges who 
consider text, history, structure, precedent, constitutional values, and 
pragmatic factors will not throw their own ideology into the mix of 
constitutional methods.130 I am not convinced that living constitutionalism 
AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS (2015); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); see also RONALD 
DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); 
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985). 
 128.  Dworkin clearly states that he believes that the moral reading of the constitution can 
override the constitutional text:  
“[Laurence’s Tribes statement of the constraining role of the constitutional text] is a 
stronger statement of textual fidelity than I [Dworkin] would myself endorse, because, as 
I said, precedent and practice over time can, in principle, supersede even so basic a piece 
of interpretive data as the Constitution’s text when no way of reconciling them all in an 
overall constructive interpretation can be found.”  
Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1249, 1259–60 (1997). Dworkin’s moral readings approach allows judges to adopt the 
“constructive interpretation” of the constitutional text that makes constitution law “the best that it can 
be”—and this method requires judges to rely on their moral beliefs. The full argument that Dworkin’s 
complex and shifting approach is unconstrained cannot be made on this occasion. See generally 
Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 1. 
 129.  Defenders of common law constitutionalism might argue that precedent and the doctrine 
of stare decisis provide sufficient constraint, but Strauss’s understanding of the force of precedent 
makes it clear that these constraints are week: 
[P]rovisions of the text of the Constitution are, to a first approximation, treated in more or 
less the same way as precedents in a common law system. The effect of constitutional 
provisions is not fixed at their adoption—or, for that matter, at any other time. Instead, 
like precedents, provisions are expanded, limited, qualified, reconceived, relegated to the 
background, or all-but-ignored, depending on what comes afterward—on subsequent 
decisions and on judgments about the direction in which the law should develop. 
David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 57 
(2015); Strauss offers no account of the constraining force of precedent in this article. He makes no 
mention of the doctrine of stare decisis. But as the quoted passage demonstrates, Strauss does make 
it clear that precedents can be “expanded, limited, qualified, reconceived, relegated to the background, 
or all-but-ignored, depending . . . on judgments about the direction in which the law should develop.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 130.  Constitutional pluralism allows judges to consider a variety of factors, including text, 
history, structure, workability, and constitutional values (the list varies). Because pluralism denies 
that there is any hierarchy among the factors, decisions using this method can be justified as long as 
at least one of the factors supports that outcome. If constitutional values are on this list and because 
the identify, force, and priority of constitutional values will inevitably be influenced by the moral and 
political views of the judge, this approach does not provide meaningful constraint. 
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can be squared with the rule of law and democratic legitimacy, but I am 
prepared to be surprised.131 
V. CONCLUSION: AN OPEN MIND 
Contemporary originalists focus on the public meaning of the 
constitutional text—and not on the policy preferences of the framers. An 
originalist jurisprudence would lead to a mix of outcomes—conservative, 
liberal, progressive, and libertarian—if the original meaning of the 
constitution were fully implemented. The justifications for originalism 
can appeal to a wide range of the political spectrum: most Americans 
believe that the rule of law and democratic legitimacy are important 
political values. Very few Americans would support a thoroughly 
politicized Supreme Court. 
Originalism! It is a surprising theory. It has surprising implications. 
And it is supported by surprising justifications. My aim in this Article and 
in the Regula Lecture upon which it is based is not to persuade you to 
become an originalist! Our views about originalism are deeply entrenched 
and difficult to dislodge. My own conversion to originalism from living 
constitutionalism began in the nineties and was not complete until ten 
years later. Conversions take time. I do hope that I surprised you. And if 
you are surprised, then, just maybe, you will approach originalism with 
curiosity and an open mind. 
 131.  For more on the comparison between public meaning originalism and various forms of 
living constitutionalism, see Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 1. 
